Rapid investigation and effective management of an imported cutaneous anthrax outbreak in Beijing

OBJECTIVE To explore the disposal strategies, exposure issues and improvement directions for non-infectious disease hospitals in response to imported anthrax outbreaks, and to provide references for enhancing the ability to respond to similar outbreaks. METHODS A analysis was conducted on the entire process of diagnosis, treatment, referral, epidemiological investigation, close contact management and disinfection for two imported anthrax cases handled by a non-infectious disease hospital in Beijing in 2024. RESULTS The outbreak involved two imported cases from Inner Mongolia. One case was a multi-type severe case (intestinal anthrax, anthrax meningitis, septicemic anthrax and cutaneous anthrax), who died on the eighth day of onset. An other case was cutaneous anthrax, which was cured after standard treatment. Through rapid response, the hospital initiated an emergency response immediately after discovering the characteristic eschar on the patient's skin and inquiring about the epidemiological history. The hospital and the local disease control center reports were completed within 2 hours and specialist consultation was applied for. A total of 31 close contacts were identified, including 10 medical staff and 21 patients who visited the hospital during the same period. Among them, two doctors who performed tracheal intubation were listed as key close contacts. All close contacts were placed in single-room isolation for 14 days of medical observation, and the hospital environment was terminally disinfected according to standards. There were no subsequent cases or community transmission during this outbreak, and no secondary cases or hospital-associated infections occurred. The issues exposed in this outbreak included difficulties in early identification, limitations in diagnostic capabilities of non-specialized hospitals, doctors relying on physical signs, neglecting epidemiological investigations and insufficient professional knowledge reserves. CONCLUSIONS The disposal measures for this outbreak were overall appropriate and effective. Non-infectious disease hospitals need to strengthen early identification capabilities for infectious diseases, improve emergency response plans and drills, strengthen laboratory construction and medical-prevention coordination, and build a defense line for "early detection, early reporting, early diagnosis, early isolation and early treatment" against imported and rare infectious diseases.